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Recent research has provided significant insights into the impact which policy networks, or 
institutionalised patterns of state-society relations have on the policy process. One branch of 
this literature highlights how achieving a high degree of sectoral embeddedness can enhance 
the state’s capacity to achieve industrial transformation and bolster economic competitiveness 
(Evans 1995, Weiss 1998). This paper builds on this research by assessing the impact of 
dense sectoral policy networks on the political dynamics of economy-wide, as opposed to 
sectoral business mobilisation. In the case of the recent politics of tax reform in Japan it 
would appear that concentrated sectoral policy networks may actually compromise the state’s 
reformative capacity. The argument here is that dense industry specific policy networks 
exacerbate sectoral differences over tax reform and tend to create factional cleavages among 
state agencies and policy makers. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This somewhat embryonic paper has its origins in a broader research project on the politics of 
taxation reform in advanced industrial economies and the role of institutional change in this 
process. While the dynamics of tax reform are both contingent and complex, at an empirical 
level the legitimacy of tax reform proposals is enhanced and their prospects of 
implementation improved if there is a broad, and preferably  cross-class support for reform. 
Initially these observations seemed to be consistent with the broad thrust of the ‘embedded 
autonomy’ literature and its claim that state capacity is enhanced when governments were 
able to combine Weberian bureaucratic independence with a rich web of connections with key 
actors in civil society (Evans 1995, Weiss 1998). While there is a good deal of evidence that 
sectoral embeddedness in which key industry actors work in close collaboration with public 
‘pilot agencies’ does bolster the state’s capacity to achieve industrial transformation, the 
evidence, and Japanese tax and financial reform is a case in point, is more ambiguous when it 
comes to economy wide economic reform.  
 
My tentative argument is that comprehensive tax reform, such as the introduction of a broad-
based consumption tax, requires industry wide and preferable cross-class political support. 
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This is consistent with Guy Peters (1991) observation that successful tax reform requires a 
shift from ‘self-interest’ to ‘public interest’ politics. The irony here is that while 
developmental states such as Japan, with their particularistic patterns of political 
representation and government-business relations, may enjoy heightened transformative 
capacity as a sectoral level, the institutional apparatus associated with such a system of state-
economy relations may compromise the prospects of achieving economy-wide reform. This is 
especially True of the Japanese case since the ‘bubble economy’ and the associated decline in 
the LDPs ability to aggregate interests through elaborate compensation regimes. The paper 
aims to enhance our understanding of the tensions between sectoral and economy-wide 
mobilisation and the associated implications for the state’s reformative capacity by reviewing 
the extant literature on the factors effecting business mobilisation (Vogel 1989, Polsky 2000, 
Bell 2006) Having briefly reviewed this literature the empirical section of the paper will 
assess its efficacy in terms of explaining patterns of business mobilisation in relation to tax 
reform in Japan. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the relative significance of state 
institutions, partisan actors and economic circumstances on the dynamics of class-wide 
business mobilisation. 
 
Understanding business mobilisation 
In many ways business mobilisation is confounding. Structural theories of business power 
downplay the need for the corporate sector to engage in overt or ‘instrumental’ political 
activity (Bell 1995, Hacker & Pierson 2002), while the on the supply side, the influential 
work of Mancur Olson and many after him has focused our attention on the collective action 
problems associated with business lobbying (discussed below). Moreover, in the increasingly 
liberal political economy of the late 20th and early 21st century there are arguably more 
demands on corporate leaders to deliver short-term shareholder value as opposed to investing 
time and resources in political projects which promise longer term returns (Bell 2006). Yet 
despite the persuasiveness of such arguments, the fact remains that from time to time business 
interests do mobilise politically and with considerable impact. Indeed, in the case of tax 
reform, business interests have had considerable influence and, in the Australia case for 
example, were important instigators of reform efforts (Eccleston 2000). How then can we 
explain such bursts of political activity from the business sector? The next section of the 
paper provides a brief synopsis of the extant literature on the topic which will serve as a guide 
for our analysis of business mobilisation in relation to tax reform in Japan. 
 
As noted above, Olson’s Logic of collective action (1965) arguably provides the most 
influential insights into the challenges of collective political activity on the part of business. 
The essence of this argument is that the benefits which any one firm would accrue from 
 3 
lobbying for general shifts in public policy (which would benefit society at large) would 
generally be too small to justify the investment of time and resources. Moreover, because 
public policy reform (such as putting the national tax base on a more secure footing) is a 
public good, rational corporate actors will be tempted to free ride and let others, such as 
partisan leaders, shoulder the burden of advocacy work. While this general framework is 
compelling, a line of reasoning that is of particular relevance to this paper is Olson’s 
acknowledgement that collective business action does occur, especially in the case of 
‘privileged groups’. The argument here is that political activity by business is most likely 
where a few powerful firms dominate a specific industry sector as they will be likely to 
capture a fair return for lobbying on industry specific policy issues (Olson 1965, Polsky 2000, 
Bell 2006). While this analysis, and the privileged groups case in particular, give insights into 
sectoral business mobilisation we need to look further afield to explain cases of cross-class 
business interest group activism. 
 
Perhaps the most influential work on the historical variation in business mobilisation is David 
Vogel’s Fluctuating Fortunes: The political power of business in America (1989). In contrast 
to Olson’s rational choice analysis, Vogel employs a historically grounded method and 
emphasises the importance of political and economic context in explaining class-wide 
business mobilisation. In the US in particular, with its liberal political culture, business 
interests prefer to maintain and arms length relationship from the state. This dynamic can and 
does change when business interests broadly conceived are threatened by rival political 
movements (the New Deal or the anti-corporate politics of the1960s) or economic crises such 
as that experienced during the late 1970s.1 In short, in the American context at least, broad-
based business mobilisation is best regarded as an unusual response to extraordinary political 
or economic threats. While Vogel provides significant insights at a macro-historical level of 
analysis, it says less about the mechanisms through which structural challenges ultimately 
result in business mobilisation (Polsky 2000, 459).  
 
Firstly, even amidst serious economic and political crises the collective action problems 
described by Olson still need to be mitigated. Reflecting this, subsequent research has 
highlighted a number of ideational and institutional factors which have the potential to reduce 
the transaction costs surrounding political mobilisation and lessen the risks of free riding in 
relation to advocacy. In terms of corporate organisation, institutional structures, such as peak 
industry associations and business round tables which encourage deliberation around 
                                               
1
 Doner & Schneider (2000) make a similar argument that competitive pressures resulting form 
internationalisation have prompted class-wide business mobilisation. 
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important policy issues clearly have the potential to enhance intra-class dialogue and 
cooperation (Martin 1994, Polsky 2000). 
 
In addition to institutional the organisation of firms strategically located policy entrepreneurs 
also have a significant role in building reform related coalitions and reducing transaction costs 
associated with mobilisation. Such entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in linking policy 
problems and to viable solutions and then framing policy initiatives in such a way that they 
appeal to a diverse coalition of actors (Martin 1994). Innovative entrepreneurs can also 
narrow the discourse around policy options increasing the prospects of a consensus emerging 
(Plotke 1992). While such entrepreneurs can be located within business or the state (Bell 
2006), in an innovative article Andrew Polsky (2000) argues that partisan entrepreneurs have 
the greatest incentive to build new partisan regimes, or coherent sets of processes and ideas 
which are capable of mobilising a broad coalition of actors behind a given political project. 
Where partisan entrepreneurs can have the greatest potential to facilitate cross-class business 
mobilisation is through the deployment of ideas which ‘add to the credibility the story which 
its leaders tell and leaves others political actors with no good reason to continue the quest for 
better alternatives’ (2000, 466). Overall Polsky argues that broad-based business mobilisation 
seems to be contingent on a perceived crisis or opportunity, a shared interest among key 
actors in relation to appropriate policy solutions and entrepreneurs prepared to absorb the 
political risks and transaction costs associated with business mobilisation. 
 
While this emphasis on structural context, interpretive frames and entrepreneurial actors adds 
significantly to our understanding of the contingent factors which shape business 
mobilisation, it arguably downplays the influence of the broader institutional context in which 
business is located and the role of the state in particular (Bell 2006). While this failure to 
consider the institutional structure of the state and its influence business mobilisation is 
largely a product of the fact that the literature described above seeks to explain temporal 
variation in American business power, rather than being comparative, it is nonetheless 
essential to give greater consideration institutional variables if we want to explain variations 
in business mobilisation between states and modes or ‘varieties’ of capitalism.  
 
In many ways focusing on the institutional determinants of business mobilisation and state-
economy relations is nothing new. There is of course a long tradition in the neo-corporatist 
literature of emphasising how the organisational structure and capacity of labour 
organisations underpins specific forms of state-economy intermediation (Swenson 1991, for a 
summary see Bell 1995). More recently the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature has shifted the 
spotlight to the role of firms and corporate organisation in creating distinctive social systems 
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of production (Hall & Soskice 2001). While these approaches highlight how the historical 
organisation and capacity of key economic actors (both labour and business) can have a 
profound influence on the structure of nationally distinctive political economies, I would 
argue that they tend to down play the influence of broader regime characteristics such as 
prevailing political culture and state institutions and the patterns of interest representation 
which public structures create, or as Amyx has recently argued in her work on financial 
reform in Japan(2004, 12) ‘insufficient attention has been paid to state structures and agent 
characteristics in our studies of associational systems’. 
 
Of the extant literature on the impact of state tradition and structures on patterns of business 
mobilisation the majority concentrates on liberal market economies and highlights how the 
fragmentation of state structures combined with an autonomous and competitive business 
culture hinders the formation of authoritative associational structures which in turn serve as 
the basis for more concentrated networks linking state and civil society. An early and 
influential exposition of the relationship between state institutions and associational 
organisation and engagement in the policy process was Atkinson and Coleman’s research on 
Canadian policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman 1989). They argue that the patterns of 
business mobilisation and the prospects for developing collaborative forms of state-economy 
relations would be influenced by prevailing state structures and cultures leading to the 
conclusion that ‘meso-level phenomena cannot be explained in isolation from broader 
political phenomena’ (1989, 67). More specifically, they predict that in liberal market systems 
where the state lacks institutional autonomy interest groups tend to be  disorganised and 
fragmented hindering the formation of strong associational structures and capable of 
supporting collaborative forms of state-economy relations.   
 
Martin Smith (1993) and Stephen Bell (1995) have built on Atkinson and Coleman’s research 
by highlighting the state’s seminal role in creating and sustaining associational structures. In 
particular Bell’s (1995) Australian research affirms earlier claims that in liberal states a 
combination of weak state structures, fragmented economies and a firm-centric business 
culture ‘produce, in broad terms, the expected pattern of fragmented business associations 
engaged in traditional forms of policy advocacy, lobbying and pressure pluralist political 
activity’(p.25).  
 
The broad goal of this paper is to extend the research agenda described above to considering 
the impact of state structures and political culture on the cross-class business mobilisation in 
coordinated economies because while there is an established literature on the benefits of 
sectoral business mobilisation in coordinated economies there has arguable been less research 
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on the prospects of for cross-class business mobilisation in this context. Empirically the case 
study material below describes patterns of business mobilisation in Japan with particular 
reference to the issue of tax reform. The argument being advanced is that historically 
entrenched patterns of sectoral business mobilisation and engagement with the state actively 
hindered the prospects of achieving cross class business support for tax reform. 
 
The disaggregated nature of Japanese business representation 
In many ways Japan’s distinctive political economy in which, until recent times, a strong 
bureaucratic state and concentrated industrial interests have effectively subordinated elected 
political representatives has a long history. The power and authority of the Japanese state and 
its close relationship to big business had its origins in the Meiji Restoration of the 19th 
Century (Wilson 2003, 89). As has been well documented this system of concentrated webs 
of interrelated firms or keiretsu and authoritative state agencies such as MITI and the Ministry 
of Finance provided the foundations of the state-led development model central to Japan’s 
post-war economic growth (Johnson 1982). Yet these structural foundations were augmented 
by other institutional features of the so called ’55 system.  
 
Central among these was Japan’s electoral system and its heavy reliance (up until 1994 at 
least) on multi-member electorates which encourages intra-party competition. In practice the 
Japanese electoral system underpinned the broader system of particularistic interest 
representation which has dominated modern Japanese politics because once established in the 
Diet politicians, and LDP members particular, could afford to overlook their electoral 
constituents and would instead focus on building policy expertise and links with business 
which would ensure their careers in politics and beyond. This is the basis of what is referred 
to as zoku politics, or the politics of policy tribes in which ambitious politicians devote their 
professional careers to promoting the cause of a narrow sectional interest or client group 
(Curtis 1999, 53-54). 
 
The system of zoku politics in which key industrial sectors work closely with authoritative 
and expert ‘pilot agencies’ while protected by loyal zoku members in the Diet was effective in 
designing and subsidising sectoral industry and development policy (Weiss 1998). Indeed 
during the rapid economic growth experienced up until the late 1970s ensured that 
relationships between key state and private actors with shared interests were institutionalised 
and supported by ‘circles of compensation through which the Japanese state allocated 
benefits’ (Wright 1999, 947). Reflecting the importance of state structures on patterns of 
business representation, the polycentric structure of the Japanese state has actively promoted 
the fragmentation of interest representation and the creation of sectoral industry associations 
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or gyokai leading to the formation a multiplicity of disaggregated policy communities. 
Despite various political and electoral reforms of the early 1990, many commentators have 
argued the ability of the Japanese state to coordinate and restructure the national economy has 
deteriorated in recent years (Wright 1999). Whereas at the height of the economic boom state 
agencies had the political authority and financial resources to guide and cajole disparate tribes 
towards national economic goals there are now real limits to this type of compensatory 
politics. Secondly, a strong revisionist literature argues that the relative power (and solidarity 
within) key state agencies such as MoF has declined relative to political leaders in recent 
times and that partisan actors are more likely to promote the narrow policy concerns of their 
constituents rather than national reform issues. Finally, Japanese firms themselves have 
become transnational in scope and as a consequence industrial interests are not as beholden to 
state actors as they once were. If anything, the greater political autonomy enjoyed by 
Japanese firms has resulted in a deepening of interest group fragmentation. According to 
Gerald Curtis: 
 
In the early years of LDP rule…..powerful interest groups such as Nokyo, 
Keidanren, Sohyo and the Japanese Medical Association, exerted considerable 
influence over public policy. Japan in the 1990s was characterized by a public 
opinion that was uncertain and ambivalent about national goals. It was also 
characterized by the fragmentation and weakening of formerly large and 
powerful interest groups with the importance of peak organizations among 
business and labour declining creating a more pluralistic system of interest 
representation. (1999, 53) 
 
At a sectoral level the Japanese state-economy relations may be renowned for their high 
levels of embeddedness and their close and at time productive patterns of state-economy 
relations but, as this brief overview has demonstrated, many of the structures which facilitate 
this sectoral integration actively hinder the prospects for class-wide mobilisation and have 
undermined many peak associational structures. During the 1990s, despite the rhetoric of 
state-led development, it was increasingly apparent that there was an acute need for 
economy-wide reforms and it was not obvious if any one agency or actor had the capacity to 
govern the Japanese economy. The case study presented below describes the role of Japanese 
business and the effectiveness of associational representation around the issue of tax reform 
from the late 1970s to the present day. Tax reform and the introduction of proposals to 
increase a national consumption tax have been fiercely contested in Japan over the past 
quarter of a century and provide a clear test of the ability Japanese business to form effective 
cross-class coalitions and peak associational structures (Kato 1994, Ishi 2001).  
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Business mobilisation and tax reform in Japan 
 
Like so many other aspects of the Japanese political economy, Japan’s post-war tax system 
was a product of the United States occupation. The Shoup mission of 1949 saw American 
economists devise a taxation blueprint which featured a reasonably comprehensive and 
progressive income tax base, complemented by a broad based consumption tax (Ishi 2001, 
Ch. 2). However, in an omen for the future of the Japanese VAT, the introduction of the 
consumption tax proposed by the Shoup Mission was postponed on a number of occasions 
before eventually being abandoned in 1953 (Ishi 2001, 270-271). The second development of 
note in post-war period was the extensive use of tax policy as an instrument of 
industrialisation and economic development. This coordinated use of a range of policy 
instruments to promote industrial investment and production was at the heart of what Johnson 
(1982) famously described as the ‘development state’. As far as the tax base was concerned 
this led to a highly schedualar system with countless exemptions and concessions devised 
with a view to promoting industrial development and appeasing the ruling party’s key 
constituents reinforcing the dynamics of the zoku politics described above (Kato 1994, 72). 
These were the years of the Japanese miracle economy and with economic growth exceeding 
an average of 10% per annum between 1955 and 1972 there were few pressures on public 
finances (Suzuki 2000. ch4.). It seems that all ships float on an incoming tide. 
 
Like all other developed economies Japan’s budget and tax system came under pressure in the 
economic downturn of the 1970s. It could be argued that owing to its developmentalist brand 
of capitalism Japan was hit harder that most with its underdeveloped welfare system and 
dependence on very high levels of economic growth. In combination these structural factors 
culminated in a formal ‘declaration of fiscal crisis’ and for the first time in the post-war 
period the Japanese Government ran a significant budget deficit. 
 
The responsibility for dealing with this unprecedented fiscal crisis fell squarely on the 
shoulders of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). While there is much debate concerning the 
ultimate power of central state agencies in the Japanese political system, few would dispute 
the claim that the MoF is ‘arguably the most powerful and prestigious ministry in Japan.’ 
(Suzuki 2000, 11). A combination of policy diffusion (the success of VAT style consumption 
taxes in Europe), the fact that Japan had no comprehensive consumption tax and therefore 
should utilise this tax base, and ironically, perceived political advantages, led the MoF to 
recommend the introduction of a VAT style of consumption tax (Kato 1994, 77-80). To this 
time taxation had been regarded as highly specialised field of policy making which was not 
generally of wider political interest or concern. Traditionally discussion was confined to 
 9 
senior MoF officials, select representatives of business and a few senior members of the LDP 
governing party with a particular interest in taxation issues. This led to tax policy being made 
by what Kato has described as ‘an exclusive and intensive network’ (Kato 1994, 81). This 
process is also reasonably institututionalised with deliberations being conducted by the 
Government Tax System Research Council (GTSRC), which while being dominated by the 
MoF, included representation of the groups mentioned above. Beyond this, the LDP has its 
own tax research council which generally liaises with the GTSRC and historically endorses 
their proposed tax policies. While this  institutionalised system of negotiation and deliberation 
surrounding policy making included selective business representation it soon became 
apparent that when the tax policy agenda shifted from being distributive (an instrument of 
active industry support) to being redistributive, then any business consensus in relation to tax 
reform would be more fragile. 
 
Despite misgivings on the part of business, failure to introduce a VAT in Japan in the late 
1970s was remarkable for two reasons. Firstly there was a political consensus that drastic 
policy action had to be taken to address the budget deficit, in the language of John Kingdon 
(1984), a policy window had been opened. Secondly Prime Minister Ohira was a strong 
advocate of a VAT and secured cabinet support for a new consumption tax in early 1979. 
Reflecting the selective nature of business involvement in the development of the Ohira 
reform proposals, business groups from the Keidanren down expressed concern on a number 
of fronts. While the GTSRC had made concessions to some stakeholders, there was a 
consensus that consultations had been too rushed and the tax reforms inadequately explained. 
As political opposition built on a number of fronts, including within the LDP, Ohiro was 
forced to shelve his tax reform proposals two weeks prior to the 1979 election. While the LDP 
was able to secure a narrow majority, Ohiro and his promotion of a consumption tax, was 
blamed for this poor electoral showing and tragically the Prime Minister collapsed and died 
during the ensuing factional battle over the LDP leadership. This failed attempt to introduce a 
VAT in late 1970s demonstrated that even with the strong support of powerful state agencies 
such as MoF combined with the committed leadership from Primer Minister Ohira tax reform 
was only going to be politically possible with broad-based business and community support 
(Kato 1994, 111).  It seemed that the introduction of a VAT was going to be an effective test 
of the class-wide business mobilisation. 
 
By the mid-1980s the fiscal problem still loomed large. And since the failed 1979 attempt to 
introduce a new consumption tax, the ‘Olsonian’ policy alternative favoured by big business 
of balancing the budget via spending cuts had been discredited (Ishi 2001, 321). Significantly 
in terms of business interest in the tax reform debate, the Nakasone administration, hoping to 
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provide income tax cuts, increased levels of corporate taxation (Kato 1994 147-148). 
Business from the Keidandran down was outraged with this policy demonstrating the 
difficulties of balancing the competing demands of powerful sectional interests and the 
broader electoral concerns when framing tax reform packages. However, these class-wide 
increases in business taxation and impact that they had on the material interests of corporate 
Japan forced a reassessment of business attitudes to a VAT (Kato 2003, 175,). As it became 
more obvious that addressing the budget deficit required either introducing a new 
consumption tax or eliminating the many tax concessions and exemptions that underpinned 
the developmental state, in an example of what Hacker & Pierson (2002) describe as political 
‘feedback’ some significant sections of the business community reassessed the policy 
priorities. For example, the Keidandran came to support a broad based consumption tax 
during 1985, although they had a preference for a single staged consumption tax rather than a 
VAT believing that it would have a smaller impact on small to medium business and the retail 
sector (Kato 1994, 161-162). Yet business preferences on tax reform remained fragmented 
with Nissho (Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry), who count a significant number 
of small to medium sized firms in its membership, strongly opposed the tax leading to a 
formal split in the GTSRC (Kato 1994, 168). 
 
Nakasone was a relatively powerful and charismatic leader and unusually for a Japanese 
politician was prepared to stand up to business. Unlike Ohira, he was not very interested in 
the detail of policy and was happy to defer most decisions to the bureau dominated 
government policy councils such as the GTSRC. Nakasone’s political instinct was to stand up 
to special interests that dominated Japanese politics and address the deficit and provide tax 
cuts to wage earners through broadening the income tax base, a strategy which was popular 
with the wider electorate who were growing tired of concessions granted to key LDP 
constituents. While these popular income tax cuts were proposed in 1986, they did alienate 
many traditional LDP supporters and failed to significantly increase revenue yield leading to 
speculation, which was fueled by the MoF and Nakasone’s Finance Minister Takeshita, that a 
broad based consumption tax would have to be introduced after the national elections to be 
later that year. Given the lukewarm business support for a broad based consumption tax and 
growing concerns among the wider electorate that it would be regressive in its impact, 
Nakasone was forced to provide a commitment 'not to introduce a large scale indirect tax’ 
(Ishi 2001, 326; Kato 1994, 165).  
 
Away from the heat of the hard fought election 1986 campaign (at least by Japanese 
standards) Nakasone and his administration began to consider how best to salvage the VAT 
agenda. While there was a growing recognition of the need to introduce a broad based 
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consumption tax Japan’s traditional system of policy making was incapable of the type of 
interest aggregation needed to build a broad coalition of support for tax reform. For example, 
Rather than using existing institutional structures to build a broader coalition for tax reform 
Nakasone deliberately ‘stacked’ the membership of the GTSRC with members he knew were 
advocates of a consumption tax (Kato 1994, 166). Perhaps more seriously, the LDP party 
apparatus failed to act as an effective link between decision makers and the broader 
constellation of interests the party traditionally represented. In Andrew Polsky’s (2000) terms 
there was an absence of partisan entrepreneurs capable of enhancing support for the tax 
reform agenda. The senior LDP heirs to Nakasone’s leadership urged him to press ahead with 
reforms regardless of the political fallout because they did not want to inherit a fiscal crisis 
when they took control of the party. With Japan’s elite committed to a VAT it came as no 
surprise when in December 1986 the GTSRC outline a proposal to introduce a 5% VAT 
which formed the basis of legislation to be introduced into the Diet the following year. 
 
1987 saw intense lobbying around the VAT proposal which was in many ways unprecedented 
in modern Japanese politics. Concerned about the potential impact on small firms, consumers 
and the broader economy and incensed by Nakasone’s deceit, ad hoc coalitions sprang up to 
oppose the tax proposal. Even the fact the VAT revenue would be used to fund income tax 
cuts did not seem to quell voter’s anger. In terms of broad theories of state action, this was 
classic pressure pluralism as the desperate Nakasone Government reacted by offering 
numerous concessions to sectional groups. After the LDP vote collapse in a March 1987 bi-
election the LDP backbench became openly hostile the Nakasone tax reform and threatened to 
veto the legislation in the Diet as well as demanding better representation in the policy 
process through a reinvigorated LDPTSRC. By May 1987, facing defeat in the Diet, 
Nakasone was forced drop the 5% VAT.  
 
Despite Nakasone’s resounding defeat the budget deficit remained. Even although the Nakasone 
Government did achieve some meaningful expenditure cuts the estimates put the real budget deficit in 
the 1986 financial as high as 26 trillion Yen (Suzuki 2000, 177). Given this context the new Takeshita 
Cabinet (which came to power in November 1987) had little choice other than to revisit the VAT issue. 
In a demonstration of strategic learning on the part of both state and societal actors this third attempt 
was charaterised by increased cooperation and deliberation among key stakeholders. At the level of 
interest group politics there was growing awareness of the need to broaden the tax base which resulted 
growing interest group support for reform. The ‘people’s conference on tax reform’, which had been 
such an effective coalition against the VAT in 1986, met in March 1988 and while cautious, was much 
more muted in its opposition to the Takeshita propsal. The vast majority of business associations that 
had previously been outspoken in their opposition to the introduction of a VAT now supported its 
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introduction, including Nissho members (small businesses who had been the most outspoken critics of 
a VAT). The last real bastion of business opposition were the large retailers’ groups, and they too 
agreed to support the new VAT (Kato 1994, 199-200). Yet, as will be argued below, this cross-class 
consensus in relation to consumption tax reform was the fragile product of specific economic and 
political conditions.  
 
The state’s policy making strategy was also modified in an attempt to build stronger links with the vast 
array of private stakeholders and enhance social embeddedness. The GTSRC conducted extensive 
consultation including a broad cross section of business and, in an unprecedented move, even the peak 
labour organization (with close links to the Japanese Socialist Party), Rengo (Kato 1994, 207). Beyond 
20 separate consultation held across Japan by the GTSRC, to ensure support among the LDP’s 
traditional constituents a reinvigorated LDPTSRC also held unprecedented consultations. In order to 
bolster electoral support for the package numerous concessions were made to firms to ease compliance 
burdens. 
 
In addition to the growing cross-class political support for the introduction of a consumption tax rapid 
increases in stock and property values over 1987-88 also influenced the reform debate in two important 
ways. More specifically Ishi (2001, 328-29) argues that the start of the bubble economy had two 
important effects. Firstly it increased economic inequality in Japan as wealthy investors were the main 
beneficiaries of rising asset prices. The excesses of the bubble economy tended to highlight the massive 
tax concessions which investment income enjoyed relative to wages. This growing concern about 
income inequality enabled policy makers to frame the tax reform debate in terms of improving the 
fairness of the tax system. Secondly, the bubble economy led to significant natural revenue growth 
which, in contrast to the late 1970s and much of the 1980s, meant structural tax changes did not 
necessarily have to raise more revenue. This growth in revenues allowed the Takishita government to 
propose a VAT with a modest rate while offering significant compensation to key interest groups. In 
short, the Takishita Bill of 1988 was a much more politically considered attempt to introduce a broad 
based consumption tax. More significantly, given this papers interest in causes of class-wide business 
mobilization is the fact that fiscal dividend of the bubble economy allowed the Takishita government to 
effectively compensate business generally (through generous exemptions and the proposed use of the 
unusual ‘accounts’ method of calculating the VAT which resulted in significant cash-flow advantages) 
and hostile sectoral interests in particular. Indeed, as scholars such as Calder (1988) have argued, cross-
sectoral compensation became a key LDP strategy to address policy crises in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
Despite the fact that few analysts expected serious political fallout from the introduction of the new 
(3% VAT), the infamous ‘Recruit scandal’ swept all before it during the second half of 1988 as the tax 
legislation passed the Diet (Kato 1994, 211). This corruption scandal, which involved senior 
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bureaucrats and LDP members accepting bribes, affected the tax reform debate because the main 
proponents of the VAT in both the LDP (including both Nakasone and Takeshita) were involved, 
seriously undermining their credibility. Secondly, a central justification for the reforms was to improve 
the fairness and equity of the tax system – After the scandal broke and the architects of the package 
were exposed, the electorate began to doubt if the reforms would actually achieve these goals. As even 
those with a casual interest in Japanese politics will know, after being reluctantly accepted by the 
Japanese public the Recruit scandal led to a renewed attack on the VAT and its LDP sponsors. In the 
Upper House (House of Councilors) election in July 1989 the LDP suffered a serious defeat prompting 
some significant revisions to the original VAT legislation. However the fall out from the new 
consumption tax was short lived as the opposition parties were unable to outline a more popular 
alternative to the tax. While the credibility of the LDP and the economic impact of the consumption tax 
would be called into question on numerous occasions in the following decade, in the short term at least 
the LDP recovered and were able to secure a victory in the 1990 general election ensuring the 
consolidation of an amended VAT. 
 
Just as the bubble economy of the late 1980s enhanced the political viability of consumption tax reform 
in Japan, the persistent recession of the 1990s placed unprecedented strains on public finances and 
exacerbated the political challenges associated with fiscal reform. Whereas the bubble economy 
provided the Takishita Government with the financial resources to provided generous compensation 
and transitional arrangements to dissident business groups, the fiscal climate confronting Japan in the 
1990s could not have been more different. There was a long held view in the MoF and tax policy 
circles that the 3% consumption tax introduced in 1989 would have to be increased to consolidate 
Japan’s growing public debt and expenditures associated with the aging population, yet the recession of 
the early 1990s clearly was not an appropriate time to increase VAT rate. In an attempt to both improve 
the adequacy of the Japanese tax base and stimulate demand in the post-bubble economy the post-1993 
Coalition Government elected to cut income and corporate taxes immediately and increase the VAT to 
5%  in 1997 by which time it was anticipated that the Japanese economy would have resumed its 
growth trajectory (Kato 2003, 191; Ishi 2001, 340, Steinmo & Akaishi 2006). However the 1990s 
came to known as the ‘lost decade’ with the economy faltering under the weight of an ailing banking 
sector, weak domestic demand and increasing international competition. In this context not only was it 
difficult to compensate interests that would be adversely affected by increasing the VAT rate, but the 
consumption tax itself was seen as exacerbating the ongoing recession. 
 
In the early years of the 21st Century, with weak economic growth is slowly taking root in Japan, the 
fiscal issues facing the world’s second largest economy remain as a acute as ever. Despite the fact that 
influential groups in the tax policy arena, such as the GTSRC, Nippon Keidanren and Rengo have 
urged the LDP Government to increase the consumption tax as a matter of priority, Prime Minister 
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Koizumi refuses to act, instead devoting his leadership to a long term agenda of privatizing the 
Japanese postal system and its associated banking network.2 While most explanations of this reluctance 
to confront the tax reform issue (despite the budget deficit approaching 14% o GDP in 2005 – among 
the worst in the developed world) attribute Koizumi’s aversion to the political risks associated with 
increasing the VAT rate, according to insiders such as Hiromitsu Ishi (Chair of the GTSRC) part of this 
reluctance is because of entrenched sectional opposition from Japanese business. In Ishi’s words the 
‘zoku politics is still very strong’3. Indeed close links between sectional opponents of the consumption 
tax and Diet members extend well beyond the LDP with the recently deposed leader of the Democratic 
Party of Japan, Katsuya Okada’s reluctance to increase the consumption being attributed to his family’s 
extensive interests in the retail sector.  
 
Conclusion 
What does this account of the politics of the Japanese tax reform contribute to our broader 
understanding of the roles of political culture, firm and state structures and prevailing political and 
economic conditions in the dynamics of class-wide business mobilization? First and foremost it 
highlights the complex combinations of institutional, ideational and economic forces which shape 
patterns of state-economy relations generally and the dynamics of cross-class business mobilization in 
particular. In terms of research methodology this demands a grounded and ideographic approach to the 
study of business politics.  
 
In terms of our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of business mobilsation the case study 
suggests that formal state structures and informal, although equally well entrenched political practices, 
lie at the core Japan’s patterned pluralism and sectoral patterns of state-economy relations. Japan’s 
post-war Zoku politics is the modern manifestation of century old practice which has been shaped and 
reinforced by the modern polycentric bureaucracy, electoral system and practice within the LDP. 
While Japan’s keiretsu corporate structures have reinforced this pattern it would difficult to argue that 
firm structures have played a dominant role in creating Japan’s sectoral political economy. Perhaps it 
would be more reasonable to argue that the organisation and culture of both firm and state have been 
mutually constitutive in this process. On the balance the evidence in this paper highlights the 
foundational role of state structures in shaping patterns of state-economy relations and, as Amyx (2004) 
has recently argued, and in stark contrast to classic accounts of developmental capacity, the structure of 
the Japanese state actively hinders class-wide business mobilisation. 
 
                                               
2
 For example, the Nippon Keidanren in its Japan 2025  policy blueprint called on the Government to increase the 
consumption tax from 5% to 16% by 2014. 
3
 Interview with Hiromitsu Ishi January 2005. 
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Yet at a more detailed level of analysis the case of tax reform and the Takeshita proposals of the late 
1980s in particular demonstrate that class-wide business mobilization is possible despite the 
institutional constraints described above. This example certainly adds weight to Andrew Polsky’s 
(2000) claims that partisan elites play a crucial role in cross-class business mobilsation with political 
LDP leaders attempting to placate sectional interests in relation to contested policy issues with 
generous compensation. In the case of the 1988 consumption tax proposal this was achieved by 
introducing the VAT at a low rate and generous exemptions and withholding provisions.  
 
In contrast to the Takeshita reforms, the Japanese experience during the ‘lost decade’ has been much 
more sobering as partisan elites have lacked the resources and incentives to aggregate interests and 
push ahead with contested reform proposals. This has led long time observers of Japanese tax politics 
such as Junko Kato (2003, 233) to conclude that as the LDP has come under greater electoral pressure 
during the 1990s it has tended to fragment with senior members increasingly beholden to sectional and 
regional interests. Not withstanding the recent activism of the Nippon Keidanren and other prominent 
groups, in the absence of the resources and exceptional political leadership Japanese politics remains 
fragmented and sectoral industry associations or gyokai continue to exercise influential with dissident 
business groups, such as the Japan Retailers Association. remaining entrenched in their opposition to 
increasing the consumption tax and influential in the Diet. 
 
More broadly this paper affirms many the increasing number of revisionist accounts of Japan’s 
contemporary political economy which highlight the governance limits of the Japanese state (for a 
summary see Wright 1999). It would appear that in the case of taxation policy in particular there is a 
lack of collaborative institutions capable of aggregating the vast array of interests that are affected by 
proposals such as increasing the value added tax. This is in stark contrast to other policy arenas where 
deliberation is generally limited to a relatively narrow ranged sectoral stakeholders. This important 
distinction helps us understand how the Japanese state can possess significant capacity in relation to 
policies concerning industrial transformation (where interest aggregation is achieved through a web of 
collaborative policy making committees) (Weiss 1998), yet struggle to build political support for 
comprehensive tax reform. In part this divergence reflects the central theme of this paper: that sectoral 
patterns of business politics may actually hinder the achievement of cross-class solidarity on policy 
issues of national significance and limit the capacity of the state to achieve economic reform. As Colin 
Crouch (2005) has recently argued, ideal types concerning models of capitalism and state capacity have 
the potential to obscure the diversity of processes that occur in modern capitalist systems. 
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